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SUPREME

The purchase by a railroad company of stock in another company
-whose line is not parallel, for the purpose of acquiring the latter's right
-of way, is valid under How. (Mich.) Stat., 34o3, authorizing any rail-road company which had in good faith entered upon the construction
of its road. and become unable to complete the same, to sell the road and
its rights and fraichises to any other railroad company not having the
same terminal points and not being a competing line.
THE POWER OF ONE RAILROAD COMPANY TO PURCHASE STOCK
IN ANOTHER.

The rapid tendency towards consolidation of smaller railroad companies into great systems, now progressing in the
-United States, makes the question of the legality of a course
not unfrequently practiced for such a purpose, one of much
'.interest
A corporation is a creature of the Act of Incorporation and
:as such has no other powers than are expressly granted or
are necessary to effect the ends and objects of its existence.
The charter being a contract between the public and individuals must be strictly construed. Each right the corporation possesses need not be specially enumerated, but no
authority can be inferred other than for purposes dir6ctly
conferred: The New Orleans, etc., Co. v. Dock Co., 28 La.
Ann. 173; Franklin v. Lewiston Institution for Savings, 68
Me. 43.
'Reported in 51 N. W. Rep. Ic63.
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The right of a railroad company over its funds cannot be
construed according to the rules applicable to litcrary, scientific and religious corporations. Such corporations require
authority to invest their money in order to maintain themselves and preserve whatever may be given them. In such
charters the power, if not expressly mentioned, is implied, that
they' may successfully engage in the enterprises for which
they are organized and render what funds they have productive.
At common law the directors of one railroad company have
no authority to invest their capital or profits in the stock of
another. Railroad corporations are chartered to transport
passengers or merchandise, and are bound to apply all the
monies and property of the company for

that purpose.

Investing their funds in that of other corporations is not
within the scope of the business for whiclh they are incorporated: Munsell v. Midland, etc., R. R. Co. (1863), I H. &
M. 130; Woods v. Memphis, etc., R. R. Co., 5 Ry. & Corp.
L. J. 372; Hazelhurst v. The Savannah, etc., R. R. Co.,
43 Ga. 13; Haver v. New York, etc., R. R. Co., 19 Abb. N.
Cas. 456; Macintosh v. Flint, etc., R. R. Co., 34 Fed. Rep.
582; The Central, etc., R. R. Co. v. The Penna. R. R. Co.,
36 N. J. Eq. 475; Solomens v. Laing, 12 Beav. 339; The
Great Northern Ry. Co. v. The Great Eastern Counties Ry.
Co., 21 L. J. Ch. 837; The New Orleans, etc., Steamship Cov. Ocean Dry Dock Co., 28 La. Ann. 173; The Great Western Ry. Co. v. The Metropolitan Ry. Co., 32 L. J. Ch. 382;.
Milbank v. New York, etc., R. R. Co., 64. How. Pr. 20.
--Every charter of a private corporatidn *is a contract, first between the State and the corporation-to which each is solemnly bound-the State that it will not impair the obligationthe corporation that it will perform the objects of its corporation
a'nd keep within the powers granted to it; secondly, between
the stockholders themselves. The stockholders are bound to
consent to the management of the affairs of the corporation
by fhe -majority, and by the by-laws which the majority
makes. And the whole on the other hand agree with each
other that they will apply the funds of the company to the
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objects and puroses of the charter and not otherwise. Both
as between the State and the corporators, the -law. of this
contract is the charter. The State has granted to it no rights
and the individual stockholders have clothed it with no rights,
except such as are clearly and expressly set down in- the
charter: Central R. R. Co. v. Collins, 40 Ga. 582.
State constitutions sometimes contain express prohibitions
against the purchase of stock in other roads. On- the other
hand, singre companies are occasionally authorized -to do so
by their charters and in other instances, general law; Zabriskie
v. R. R. Co., 23 How. (U.S.) 381; or special Acts; Mayor of
Balo. v. Balto., etc., R. R. Co., 21 Md. 5o; confer the power.
If one railroad company may, at its option, buy the stock
of another it undertakes a new contract not contemplated by
its 6harter: Hazelhurst v. The Savannah, etc., R. R. Co.,
43 Ga. 13.
It is no answer that the action of the directors is of benefit
or profit to the shareholder seeking to prevent the purchase.
Whether it is to his interest, is for him to judge. He has a
legal right to insist that the company shall be kept within the
legitimate scope of the charter: Elkins v. Camden, etc., R. R.
Co., 36 N. J. Eq. 5; Central R. R. Co. v. Collins, 4o Ga. 582.
Power expressly granted to a railroad company to maintain
the road does not authorize a purchase of stock in a rival
road because such purchase is necessary to its self preservation.
The Central Railroad Company was given by its charter
power to "have, purchase, receive, possess, enjoy and- retain
to them and their successors, lands, rents, tenements, goods,
chattels and effects, of whatsover kind, nature and quality, the
same may be, and to sell, grant, demise, alienr or dispose of the
same." It was argued that such an indefinite grant authorized
them to purchase and hold any kind of property necessary to
protect the road; and vwas not precluded such a construction
by a proviso restricting the power to such lands as it might
acquire in satisfaction of debts and such as might be necessary
and proper for laying, building and sustaining the railroad.
In reply it was said by.the court, "To give these words the
meaning contended for would be to make the Central Railroad
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and Banking Company a corporation for any purpose whatever.
It might engage in- whatever enterprise that the cupidity of
its directors or their fancy or folly might suggest to them.'"
"What does a grant to maintain and sustain a railroad
include? Can it in any fair sense be construed to authorize
the engaging in any other enterprise which will extend the
business or lessen the rivalries of the company. The ' maintaining and sustaining' of the road has reference to keeping it
in repairs, supplying it with machinery and such like acts
and not to projects for extending its business, by schemes and
enterprises not contemplated and expressed in clear, unambiguous terms by the charter itself." Central R. R. Co. v. Collins,
40 Ga. 582. See contra: Ryan v. The Leavenworth, etc.,
R. R. Co., 21 Kan. 365; Atchison, etc., R. R. Co. v. Cochran,
43 Kan. 225. See, however: Penna. R. R. Co. v. Com.,
7 AtI. Rep. 368.
The General Railroad Laws of Michigan provide that one
railroad corporation may subscribe to the capital stock of any
other railroad coipany organized under the said Act with. the
consent of the latter; and by other provisions, one railroad
company is authorized to aid another having an unfinished
road, and to make running arrangements; and where their lines
are connected to enter into arrangements for their common
benefit, consistent with and calculated to promote the objects
for which they were respectively created. In Macintosh v.
Flint, etc., R. R. Co., 34 Fed. Rep. 582, it was decided that
these statutory provisions did not authorize one company to
acquire the stock and franchise of another completed company.
A company having authority to purchase a limited number
of shares in another cannot increase its holding: Solomens v.
Laing (1849), 12 Beav. 339; The Great Western Ry. Co. v.
The Metropolitan Ry. Co., 32 L. J. Ch. 382.
Since chancery will enjoin acts of this character, so will it
decline to lend its aid where, by so doing, it would give effect
to them: The Great Ncirthern Ry. Co. v. The Great Eastern
Counties R. R. Co., 21 L. J. Ch. 837; The Great Western
Ry. Co. v. The Met. Ry. Co., 32 L. J. Ch. 382. In this latter
case the company had been authorized by Parliament to hold
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a stated number of shares in another road. The directors of
this road decided to increase the number of shares, but refused
to make any allotment to the other company as shareholder.
A bill in equity was filed to compel an award of the proportion which their shares entitled them. In dismissing the bill,
Lord Justice Turner, one of the court, observed, while they
were not entitled to receive and hold the additional shares, yet
had the bill averred an intention to dispose of their allotment
and prayed that it be made in order that the benefit to be
derived from their sale might be secured to the company,
such question would be worthy of much consideration.
the purchase of stock in a parallel and competing line was
held to be prohibited by the Constitution of Pennsylvania.
which provided: "No railroad . . or the lessees, purchasers
or managers of any railroad . . . shall consolidate the stock,

property or franchises of such corporation with, or lease or
purchase the works or franchises of, or in any way control
any other railroad owning or having under its control a
parallel or competing line: Penna. R. R. Co. v. The Commonwealth (Pa.), 7 Atl. Rep. 368.
The right to lease does not give the right to buy a road or
become the purchaser of its stock: Central R. R. Co. v. Collins, 40 Ga. 582.
By the General Railroad Laws of New Jersey (Rev. p. 730,,
§ I7), and the Act of i88o (P. L. i88o, p. z3I), power was
given to railroad companies to lease their roads or any part ot
them to any other corporation or corporations of that -or any
other State, or to unite or consolidate as well as merge their
stock, property and franchises and roads with those of any
other company or companies, and it was further provided that
the company acquiring the other road might use and operate
both or either of the roads.
The Camden and Atlantic Railroad on the strength of these
statutory privileges attempted to purchase the majority of the
stock and bonds of a rival road, and assume control of certain of its debts. A bill in equity was brought to prevent
such purchase. In sustaining the injunction it was said by
the Supreme Court: The Acts of the Legislature while
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they'gave the Camden and Atlantic Railroad power to unite
and consolidate with other roads, it gave it no power to
purchase the debts of another company or its road. Union
and consolidation of two rival railroad companies are one
thing and purchase by one company of the property and franchises of the other is another. Such purchase is foreign to the
object of its incorporation. The power to build lateral or branch
roads given by the charter, was not considered to strenghthen
the contended construction: Elkins v. Camden, etc., R. R.
Co., 36 N. J. Eq. 5.
Although the company may have authority by the law of
the State where it originated, yet it cannot purchase the stock
of a road in another State, unless expressly authorized so to
do by local legislation: Woods v. The Memphis, etc., R. R.
Co. (Ala.), 5 Ry. & Corp. L. J. 372.
A State cannot by an Act subsequent to the charter, confer
the power on a railroad to invest its fund in the bonds or stock
of another: Central R. R. Co. v. Collins, 40 Ga. 582; White
v. The Syracuse, etc., R. R. Co., 14 Barb (N. Y.) 559.
By the Act of 1852, of Georgia, the Central Railroad Company was given power to lease several railroads by name as
well as any other road that might " connect" with it, and by
a subsequent Act authority was given to connect their tracks
at the city of Savannah.
In the opinion of the Supreme Court it was held that, "any
such power, though expressly granted, does not bind any of
the stockholders who do not consent to it. Each stockholder
has rights in the nature of contract, rights in the limitations as
well as in the grants to the corporation, and even the legislative will cannot under the Constitution of the United States
impair those contract rights, by making him against his will an
adventurer in an enterprise not contemplated in the original
charter: See also White v. The Syracuse, etc., R. R. Co., 14
Barb. (N. Y.) 559.
If the Legislature has-reserved to itself the right to alter the
charter of the company, the proper number of shareholders
may take advantage of a subsequent Act, authorizing a purchase of stock in another company, by the consent of a certain
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number of shareholders: White v.The Syracuse, etc., R. R'
Co-(1853), 14 Barb. (N. Y.)-559
Where no power has been reserved to the State to sanction
such a use of corporate funds, a stockholder may sometimes,
by his failure to object at the proper time, estop himself from
afterwards complaining: Macintosh v. Flint, etc., R. R. Co.,
34 Fed. Rep. 582.
In Zabriskie v. The Cleveland, etc., R. R. Co., 23 How.
(U. S.) 381, the complainant, who was a stockholder in the
defendant company, was present by proxy at a meeting at
which it was agreed to guarantee the bonds of another company. No objection was made in his behalf. It was held he
could not complain after some of the guaranteed bonds had
been sold.
So, in Hill et al. v. Nisbet et al., IOO Ind. 341, persons who
constituted a majority of the directors, when the purchase of
stock was made, were held to have no standing in equity to
question the validity of such purchase.
It is possible that a right of action which might arise out of
the relations of such companies could not be enforced : Thomas
v. R. R. Co., IOI U. S.71.
Should all the shareholders unite and authorize the use of
the company's funds for the purchase of stock in another road,
the State may, at any time, interfere and compel its sale or
deprive the company of its charter: Mathews v. Murchison
(U. S. C. C., N. Car., E. Dist.), 9 Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas. 590.
A shareholder in a company, whose stock has been' bought
by a rival company, can enjoin the rival company from voting
on the shares held by it at a meeting of hii company: Pearson
v. Railroad (1883), 62 N. H. 537.
And this rule is equally applicable, if not stronger, where
the power to vote has alone been purchased: Woods v. The
Memphis, etc., R. R_ Co. (Ala.), 5 Ry. & Corp. L. J. 372;
Haven v. New York, etc., R. R. Co., i9 Abb. N. Cas. 456.
See contra: Mathews v. Murchison, 9 Am. & Eng. R. R.
Cas. 590.
But such stockholders cannot complain because of the mere
taking title to and holding of the stock and the collection of
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dividends as they may accrue. It is only where the company
seeks to vote upon the stock and thereby control the corporation that they are prejudiced : Milbank v. New York, etc.,
R. R. Co., 64 How. Pr. 20.
State statutes have in several instances been declared to
empower a railroad corporation to hold the stock of another:
Zabriskie v. R. R. Co., 23 How. (U. S.) 381.
Section 395 r, R. S. 1881 of Indiana, authorizes any railroad
corporation organized, under the provisions of the general railroad law, "to acquire, by purchase or contract, the road, the
road-bed, real and personal property, rights and franchises of
any other railroad corporation or corporations which may cross
or intersect its line. In Hill et al. v. Nisbet et al., IOO Ind.
341, this provision was regarded as sufficiently broad to
empower a purchase of stock in an intersecting road. Mr.
Justice Mitchell, speaking for the court, said: "If in any case
it should appear to be a necessary or reasonable means to
acquire the franchise of an intersecting railroad company, and
by the averments in -the complaint, the purpose for which the
stock was purchased may be fairly inferred, no reason is perceived why it might not be accomplished by purchasing the
stock instead of purchasing the corporate property directly:'
Where extraordinary circumstances arise the common law
rule may not be enforced. A railroad company may, without express authority, acquire stock in another corporation in
satisfaction of a debt or by way of security for a claim which
is in danger of being lost, but with a view to its subsequent
sale or conversion into money so as to make good or redeem
an anticipated loss: Hodges v. New England Screw Co.,
i R. I. 312; Pierson v. R. R., 62 N. H. 537; Woods v. The
Memphis, etc., R. R. Co. (Ala.), 5 Ry. & Corp. L. J. 372k
Milbank v. New York, etc., R. R. Co., 64 How. Pr. 20.
Having obtained the stock it may collect the dividends:
Woods v. Memphis, etc., R. R. Co. (Ala.), 5 Ry. &' Corp.
L. J. 372; Milbank v. New York, etc., R. R. Co., 64 How..
Pr. 20.
In Elkins v. R. R. Co., 36 N. J. Eq. 2.33, a shareholder
filed a bill in equity to prevent the sale of 8oo shares of stock

PURCHASE STOCK

IN ANOTHER.

of another railroad, claiming that by so doing they would
depreciate their road and deprive it of its influence in the
other company. The stock had been obtained in exchange for
iron rails which they had ceased to use. It appeared the directors, believing it to be for the benefit of their road, had authorized the sale to be made by their president at a price shown to
be its market value by a public sale of part of it. The court
declined to interfere.
A corporation cannot, by a simulated compliance with the
-provisions of the law, subscribe for stock through its agents
or employ~s. In the case of the Central R. R. Co. v. The
Penna. R. R. Co., 36 N. J. Eq. 475, the National Storage
Company, incorporated under the laws of New Jersey, was
restrained from laying its tracks across the land and tracks
of the Central Railroad Company of New Jersey, because it
appeared that the capital stock of the storage company was
held in trust for persons owning large interests or largely
concerned in the management of the Pennsylvania Railroad
Company.
Where the itltra vires Act is as yet only in contemplation,
t has been urged to induce a court of equity to act, the complainant should show he would sustain irreparable injury.
But the courts have answered that they will restrain such an
act although it appear to be of material advantage to him:
Central R. R. Co. v. Collins, 4o Ga. 582; Elkins v. Camden,
etc., R. R. Co., 36 N. J. Eq. 5. Thus the directors may
be restrained from borrowing money for an anticipated purchase.
Public policy is often cited as declaring the 'annihilation of
the lesser lines as an evil. That it will result in good is
claimed by those desiring to bring the condition about. It
was said by the president of one of our trans-continental railroads: "The crystallization of small and local lines, and the
absorbtion of branch roads is viewed with grave popular
apprehension, but I cannot regard it as a thing to be dreaded.
I am very sure now, as I have been. for the last twenty
years, and as I long ago expressed myself,that a great consolidated corporation or even a trust can be held to far stricter
30
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responsibility of the law than numerous smaller and conflicting
corporations:" Cook on Stockholders, § 315, note.
Where the power to make a contract for the purchase of
stock in another companies is granted in the charter, the
public policy of such a grant is not a consideration for the
court. It has been said, however, where no such privilege
exists, that public policy furnishes an additional reason for the
application of the rules of strict construction.
In the Central R. R. Co. v. Collins, 4o Ga. 582, it was said
by the court: "All experience has shown that large accumulation of property in hands likely to keep it intact for a long
period, are dangerous to the public weal. Having perpetual
succession, any kind of a corporation has peculiar facilities
for such accumulation and most governments have found it
necessary to exercise great caution in their grants of. corporate
powers. Freed, as such bodies are, from the sure bound to
the schemes of individuals-the grave-they are able to add
field to field and power to power, until they become too
strong for that society which is made up of'those whose plans
are limited by a single life."
"There is, too, in this country, a reason for strictly construing charters and for confining corporations to their pownters
that do not exist in any others. Under other forms of government if a charter be found to have privileges which prove
dangerous, it is in the power of the State to alter or repeal
the charter. But getting their grants as most of our corporations do from the State they are held to be contracts, and it is not
in the power of the State, under the Constitution of the United
States, to materially interfere with the grant however improvident or unwise it may prove to have been. For these reasons
it has in this country, as well as in England, ever been considered the very highest public policy to keep a strict watch
upon corporations, to confine them within their appointed
bounds, and especially to , guard against the accumulation
-of large interests under their control."
Again, in Milbank v. New York, etc., R. R. Co., 64 How.
Pr. 20, Haight, J., said: "It is against public policy to permit
the officers of a corporation to take the corporate funds
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belonging to the stockholders and expend it in purchasing or
speculating in stocks of other companies. In the second
place, it is against public policy to have or permit one corporation to embarrass and control another and perhaps competing
corporation in the management of its affairs.
Equitable relief will be granted at the instance of a single
shareholder: Elkins v. Camden, etc., R. R. Co., 36-N. j[.
Eq 5 ;
Solomens v.. Laing, 12 Beav. 339; Central R. R. Co. v. Collins, 40 Ga. 582.
Nor does it matter that the shareholder asking relief
acquired his stock for the purpose of defeating an intended purchase. Where an Act is ultra vires the relief cannot be
affected by such circumstances: Elkins v. Camden, etc., R. R.
Co., 36 N. J. Eq. 5.
A State as shareholder may bring the action, but citizens in
their character as such are not proper parties: Central R. R.
Co. v,.
Collins, 40 Ga. 582 ; Woods v- Ry. Co., 5 Ry. & Corp.
L. J. 372.
Before invoking the arm of chancery it is necessary in
general to give the stockholder a standing in court that
the directors be requested to refrain from a contemplated
violation or remedy an existing one, but this is not always
necessary. It has been said, "the whole governing force
may have become so corrupt or have entered into a combination so destructive of the policy and property of the
company as to show that an appeal to the directory would
be fruitless and delay extremely perilous. In such cases, an
application to the directors would be without avail and equity
will take jurisdiction:" Woods v. Memphis, 6tc., R. R. Co.
(Ala.), 5 Ry. & Corp. L. J. 372 (Cobb's Chan.).
Where the directors have violated the charter of their company it becomes a question how far they are personally
responsible to refund money so applied. The liability has been
said to depend on whether the violation was a mistake such as
a man of ordinary prudence exercises in his own affairs. In
Hodges v. New England Screw Co., I R. I. 312, it was said:
"If the mistake was such as, with proper care, might have been
avoided they ought to be liable. If,on the other hand, the

